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Abstract
Trust in political parties is declining and with it the relevance of parties, or so the 
de-alignment hypothesis claims. Using data from recent World Values Surveys, 
this  paper  provides  evidence  that  the  assumption  is  rather  problematic. 
Longitudinal data shows that confidence is neither increasing nor declining but 
languishing at high levels. Additionally, cross-sectional data from the 2005-2008 
WVS was analyzed using statistical tests at the individual and country level. The 
results  demonstrate  that  one  important  factor  increasing  distrust  is  electoral 
disproportionality.  Regime  durability,  interpersonal  trust,  and  perceived 
democraticness  reduce  such  sentiments.  Corruption  perception  notably has  no 
effect on individual respondents but decreases distrust on the national level. The 
results  pose  the  question  whether  distrust  is  a  reason  for  concern  or  just  a 
phenomenon natural to representative democracy.
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 1. INTRODUCTION
Political  parties  are  commonly  regarded  as  vital  parts  of  modern  representative 
democracy.  Without  them,  democratic  government  is  almost  inconceivable.  Political 
parties “created democracy and […] modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of 
the  parties”,  Schattschneider  (1942,  1)  famously  proclaimed.  They fulfill  important 
political functions, such as representation, mobilization, recruitment, and structure the 
political process, to only name a few (Sartori 2005; Schmitter 2001, 72–3). Yet in recent 
years, scholars have diagnosed an erosion of the representative function of parties as a 
transmission belt of societal demands into policy. Parties, as Richard Katz and Peter 
Mair  argue,  experience  a  transformation  into agents  of  the state,  bound by external 
constraints and often unable to respond to popular demands (Katz and Mair 1995; Mair 
2009). These constraints exist for political parties in both established democracies and 
those parties in countries which experienced a more recent democratic transition, for 
example in the Third Wave of democratization (Bartolini and Mair 2001, 328–9).
Simultaneously,  trust  directed  at  political  parties  is  among  the  lowest,  when 
compared to other political institutions such as governments or parliaments (Dalton and 
Weldon  2005;  Marien  2011a).  This  observation  goes  along  with  a  vivid  discussion 
among political  science  scholars  whether  political  parties  are  declining in  relevance 
(commonly dubbed the 'de-alignment hypothesis') or still alive and kicking (Wren and 
McElwain 2007). Indeed, indicators for de-alignment such as party membership and 
party identification are decreasing in most democratic polities (van Biezen, Mair, and 
Poguntke  2012).  Paul  Webb  (2005,  635–6)  summarized  the  most  commonly  used 
observations supporting the de-alignment hypothesis: increasing electoral volatility and 
effective  numbers  of  parties,  declining  electoral  turnout,  slumping  partisan 
identification and membership which result in an increasing share of non-partisans, and 
rising levels of anti-party sentiments. These observations support the assumption that 
political parties are experiencing a decrease of public confidence.
These “anti-party sentiments” (Poguntke 1996) are not a trivial problem and have 
real-life  consequences.  Dalton  and  Weldon  (2005)  report  that  voters  with  a  low 
confidence in political parties are less likely to participate in elections and relatively 
more likely to cast their vote for 'anti-party' or 'anti-system' parties, especially from the 
right, and opposition parties. Unsurprisingly, electoral volatility also increases with the 
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feeling  that  political  parties  'do  not  care'.  Additionally,  Dalton  and  Weldon  (2005) 
furthermore  find  a  correlation  between  respondents'  trust  in  political  parties  and 
satisfaction with democracy, as well as the feeling that voting makes a difference. Their 
results illustrate the problematic effects of distrust, which affects electoral behavior as 
well as general feelings about the state of democracy. Anti-party sentiments are partly 
described as originating from ill-informed voters who are cynical about political parties 
and lack understanding of political processes (Webb 2005, 647). 
Meanwhile,  while  not  a  completely  new  phenomenon,  many  scholars  (e.g., 
Albertazzi and Mueller 2013; Bordignon and Ceccarini 2013; Mudde 2004) diagnose a 
surge of populist parties in Western democracies, whose most striking feature is their 
condemnation  of  established  political  parties  and  the  respective  party  systems  as  a 
whole. They present themselves as 'real' representatives of the popular will. In a certain 
sense, they are also the results of 'responsible' government parties, which risk to leave 
the 'representational'  aspects of their functions in a political system to such populist 
parties  (Mair  2009).  Omar  Sanchez  (2008,  316)  furthermore  points  out  that  other 
potential  results  of  party  system  de-institutionalization  and  populism  include  more 
erratic  politics,  strains  on  the  functioning  of  representative  democracy and political 
responsiveness,  corruption  and  weakened  checks  and  balances.  Only some of  these 
potential  effects  highlight  that  anti-party  sentiments  should  not  be  shrugged  off  as 
irrelevant,  especially  considering  the  rise  of  these  sentiments  in  most  democracies 
(Dalton and Weldon 2005). There is, in sum, plenty of reason to be concerned about the 
effects of anti-party sentiments. Low electoral turnout, declining party membership and 
identification,  and  a  seeming  increase  in  populist  parties,  all  can  be  understood  as 
functions  of  distrust  in  political  parties.  The  problems  caused  by  them  also  give 
credence  to  searching  for  the  factors  causing  these  sentiments,  because  the  factors 
fueling what Germans call  Parteienverdrossenheit  must first be identified before one 
can confidently try to counter them.
It is therefore surprising that even though researchers have produced a vast amount 
of  literature  on  the  subjects  of  political  trust  and  political  parties  there  is  little 
communication between both fields. This study aims to add to the literature of both 
areas in two ways. First, it provides a general overview of the development of distrust in 
political  parties,  which  is  needed  because  it  is  still  unclear  whether  confidence1 in 
1 Using such a negative variable almost inevitably leads to odd language. In order to avoid confusion,  
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parties is actually in decline or just generally low. Declining trust is often taken for 
granted without  providing further evidence.  Hence,  a  longitudinal  assessment  of the 
levels  of  trust  resolves  the  uncertainty  about  recent  trends  in  public  confidence  in 
political parties. The second and larger part of the paper is dedicated to answering a 
second set of questions: what are the factors that fuel distrust in political parties? and 
how do party system variables affect such sentiments? The following part discusses the 
underlying theoretical assumptions required to answer these questions – mostly drawn 
from Easton's  concepts  of  structural  and  personal  legitimacy –  and the  findings  of 
previous research conducted on similar questions. Data gathering, operationalization, 
and  methodology  of  the  study  are  explained  in  Chapter  3.  Empirical  evidence  is 
presented in Chapter 4. Findings are summarized and discussed in the final chapters.
 2. DISTRUST AND LEGITIMACY
To answer the question why people  distrust  political  parties,  it  is  first  necessary to 
understand the functions that political parties fulfill in a political systems. David Easton 
argues that parties are located at this input side of a political system, which, amongst 
other  institutions,  act  as  “gatekeepers”  that  control  societal  inputs  into  the  political 
system (Easton 1965, 138–9). Some of the demands entering the political system are 
translated into action, e.g. in form of statements or policies, which are the outputs of a 
political  system.  Since  not  all  demands  can  be  converted  into  outputs,  some  are 
naturally  put  aside  and  left  unanswered  (Easton  1965,  350).  Any  of  the  channels 
allowing input into the political system bears the risk of “channel failure” (Easton 1965, 
120), which is the possibility that a channel fails at the dissemination of the societal 
demands in a bottom-up process. For political parties, this phenomenon is most similar 
to a malfunction of their representational function. A decline of trust in political parties 
can therefore indicate a response to a perceived failure in channeling societal demands 
into  the  political  system  or  generating  the  expected  outputs,  i.e.,  an  ill-conducted 
representational function of political parties. 
This  representational  function  is  affected  by  institutional  features  of  democratic 
regime,  such  as  party  systems  and  electoral  rules,  because  these  features  shape 
some remarks on the language used in the paper: 'Distrust' is the commonly used term. The terms 
distrust  in  political  parties  and trust  in  political  parties  describe the same indicator  but  opposite 
values, since the coding of the outcome variable (introduced later) reaches from trust to distrust on 
both respective ends of the scale. The terms trust or confidence are used interchangeably.
3
mechanisms  of  party  interactions.  On  the  other  hand,  features  of  political  parties 
themselves – how they appear and how they act – will influence how people feel about 
them. The following two sections discuss how these two variables generate distrust in 
political  parties. Finally,  the role of national context and certain individual traits are 
presented.
 a) Party systems and trust
The structure of  party systems is  a prominent  feature that  has  an effect  on trust  in 
political parties. Although in Easton's (1965) influential work on the political system, 
political parties only play a marginal role, many other scholars examined the effects of 
party systems and electoral systems on voter representation, i.e. how structural factors 
influence  how  political  parties  channel  societal  demands.  Maurice  Duverger  for 
example  sees  the  two-party system as  the  outcome of  a  “natural  political  dualism” 
(Duverger  1990,  289),  taking  place  roughly  in  a  Left-Right  division  without  an 
'authentic'  centrist  party.  Only  political  splits  between  such  party  groups  along 
ideological  divisions  cause  two-party  systems  to  divert  into  a  multiparty  system 
(Duverger 1990, 291-295). If two-party systems are indeed a 'natural' occurrence, then 
these may be expected to channel social  demands in the most efficient way. Such a 
“cleavage-reducing” (Easton 1965, 257) tendency of two-party systems and majoritarian 
electoral systems is also favored by Easton over “divisive” multiparty systems for its 
perceived inclusiveness.  Following Downs'  (1957)  economic approach,  though,  two-
party systems ideologically converge along the median voter. In other terms, two-party 
systems limit pluralism and might necessarily, or naturally, filter out the many demands 
which are not close to the median voter. For others, the composition of the electorate, in 
form of  distinct  social  cleavages,  influences  the type of party system which can be 
considered  as  'appropriate'  for  a  specific  country  (Dahl  1990).  The  effect  of  party 
systems on which and how societal demands are transferred into the political system can 
in sum be paradoxical for two-party systems. They appear more inclusive and pluralistic 
but at the expense of weeding out societal demands which are not close to the median 
voter, and therefore bear a higher risk of 'channel failure', effectively silencing some 
demands before they are dealt with in the political system.
Evidence speaks for such a connection between party systems and notions of trust 
and legitimacy. Marien (2011b) reports a relationship between electoral systems and 
political trust. Proportional (PR) systems generate a higher level of trust compared with 
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less proportional ones, or majoritarian (FPP) systems. Marien suspects on of the effects 
of the pluralist representation in PR systems is to positively affect trust, while highly 
disproportional systems can generate high trust through a direct link between votes and 
government formation, especially in two-party systems. However, her assumption of a 
curvilinear function of disproportional representation cannot conclusively be verified, 
because the number of cases she considers does not suffice for proper generalization. 
Thus, a more straightforward conclusion from her findings would rather be that higher 
disproportionality causes lower levels of trust, i.e. a linear relationship between the two 
variables. In a similar vein, Banducci et al. (1999) demonstrated that an increase in the 
levels  of trust  directed at  representative institutions,  the government,  and politicians 
occurred  after  changing  from a  FPP system to  a  PR system with  a  case  study on 
electoral  system reform in  New Zealand  in  the  mid-1990s.  Likewise,  an  empirical 
analysis  conducted  by  Wells  and  Krieckhaus  (2006) on  the  effect  of  consensus  or 
majoritarian  democracies  on  democratic  support  amongst  losers  and  winners  of 
parliamentary elections demonstrates that institutional factors matter in the sense that 
losers feel less dis-attached in consensual systems, likely due to the lack of a winner-
take-it-all  principle  in  these  polities.  In  sum,  it  can  be  expected  that  proportional 
representation has a positive influence on trust in political parties.
H1: Disproportionality of electoral systems increases distrust in political parties.
Proportional representation has a stronger tendency to produce multi-party systems. 
In the literature on political parties, fragmented and polarized party system are often 
seen  as  problematic  and  prone  to  conflict.  Sartori  (1990)  for  example  argues  that 
extreme  pluralism,  that  a  number  of  parties  higher  than  about  five  often  causes 
"centrifugal drives" to the extremes of the Left-Right spectrum, which also includes a 
major role for anti-system system parties and irresponsible oppositions. While Sartori 
does  not  establish  a  causal  link  between  these  party  system features  with  trust  in 
political  parties,  it  might  indicate  a  paradoxical  effect  of  PR systems.  Proportional 
electoral outcomes are perceived as positive, while the party systems that emerge in PR 
systems include more relevant political parties than FPP systems – a factor that affects 
confidence in political parties too.  Aarts and Thomassen for instance (2008) report a 
negative influence of PR electoral systems on satisfaction with democracy. Measuring 
the  perceived  accountability  and  representativeness  of  electoral  systems,  the  two 
scholars  also  find  that  the  feeling  to  be  represented  by  parliamentarians  is  more 
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important for satisfaction with democracy. The perception of accountability is linked 
with satisfaction as well,  though with a statistically weaker influence. Such findings 
highlight the contradictory effect of majoritarian systems, where the linkage between 
election  winners  and  government  formation  is  usually  clear  and  direct,  whereas 
consensual systems with PR rules have a less apparent link between election outcomes 
and  government  formation,  which  oftentimes  takes  place  in  form  of  coalition 
governments. Surely, the theoretical base to formulate a thorough hypothesis about the 
influence  of  institutional  factors  from these  observations  is  weak,  but  it  suffices  to 
include  the  number  of  parties  and  ideological  polarization  on  the  national  level  as 
control variables in order to check for a possible impact of both variables on trust in 
political  parties.  It  is,  tentatively,  expected  that  the  higher  the  fragmented  and/or 
polarization of a party system, the higher the level of distrust of political parties in a 
given country, following Sartori's (1990) rather skeptical assessment of fragmented and 
polarized party systems.
 b) Parties, politicians, and trust
Besides  outlining  structural  features  of  political  systems,  Easton  also  provides  a 
typology  describing  the  different  sources  of  legitimacy  for  the  regime  and  the 
authorities, to which political parties belong. In his terms, a political systems mainly 
consists of the authorities, the regime, and the political community, each of which are 
objects of support and legitimacy (Easton 1965, 165). Ideology, structure, and personal 
qualities  are  the variables  affecting  the legitimacy of  these political  objects  (Easton 
1965, 287). Ideology is the “belief in the rightness […] and in the compatibility of a 
regime and its authorities with them” (Easton 1965, 292), and fosters the legitimacy of 
political  authorities.  The  same effect  is  exerted  on  the  “very patterns  in  which  the 
authorities are organized” (Easton 1965, 293), which addresses the general organizing 
principles of the political system. With regards to structural legitimacy, its sources are 
the belief that authorities gained power in the ways determined by the norms of the 
regime, as well as a norm-complying exercise of the powers vested to the authorities 
(Easton 1965, 298). Finally, personal legitimacy is nurtured by “the personal merit and 
worth  of  the  authorities”  (Easton  1965,  303),  i.e.  the  conduct  and  personality  of 
individual  authorities.  In  sum,  ideological  legitimacy  refers  to  the  belief  in  the 
rightfulness and organizational structure of the political  system as a whole,  whereas 
personal  legitimacy  is  defined  as  a  property  related  to  the  individual  aptness  of 
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representatives  and  office-holders.  Structural  legitimacy  means  the  nature  in  which 
authorities gained office and act according to the principles and norms established in the 
system. Structural legitimacy can thus be understood as a linkage between the systemic 
level and the individual level, in which personal legitimacy originates from personal 
characteristics and the conduct of authorities. 
David  Easton's  contribution  is  regularly  cited  as  the  theoretical  foundation  for 
analyses of political trust.  Hooghe and Zmerli for example derive their definition of 
political trust as "the expectation that political actors generally behave in a fair manner" 
(Hooghe  and  Zmerli  2011,  3)  from Easton's  concept  of  support  and  legitimacy.  A 
derived definition of trust in political parties would read as 'the expectation that political 
parties (and their members) generally behave in a fair manner'.2 Distrust in that sense 
would mean the opposite, that is the feeling that political actors do not behave in a fair 
manner,  such as determined by structural features – the 'rules of the game'  – of the 
political system and individual character traits. This definition gives the opportunity to 
test  hypotheses  about  the  influence  of  perceived legitimacy flaws  on confidence  in 
political parties. 
Evidence for such a connection between popular confidence in political parties and 
the conduct of politicians has been established by several authors. Studying Japanese 
politics  for  example,  Pharr  (2000)  found  that  the  perception  of  corruption  predicts 
distrust in public officials on a more significant level than economic performance or 
social capital. Likewise, Donnatella della Porta (2000, 209) researched the relationship 
between  corruption  perception  and  satisfaction  with  democracy in  Western  Europe, 
claiming  that  both  indicators  show a  "rough correlation".  This  effect  is  particularly 
strong when corruption of public officials is publicly displayed in scandals (Della Porta 
2000, 210). Noteworthy, this erosion of trust in political institutions does not correlate 
with a decrease of interpersonal trust or trust directed at private institutions (Della Porta 
2000, 213). Another observation was made by Chang and Chu (2006), who reported that 
2 A certain limitation to the abstract terms used by Easton is the theoretical distinction between the 
different objects of a political system. But political parties cannot discretely be ascribed to a single  
object of the political system, as they fulfill representational functions on the input side, as well as  
executive  and  structuring  functions  if  a  party is  currently holding  government  office.  This  is  a  
theoretical and methodological problem, because modern political parties transcend these boundaries. 
It  moreover raises the question how or if  citizen perception distinguishes between these different 
roles and functions of parties.
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corruption  perception  of  individual  respondents  is  a  strong  predictor  of  distrust  in 
political  institutions  in  several  Asian  democracies.  Here,  a  composite  indicator  for 
political trust is used in a multilevel analysis and a strong correlation between trust in 
different political objects reported. Chang and Chu (2006) furthermore find evidence for 
the assumption that a high perception of corruption bears the risk of a vicious circle 
threatening the quality of democratic governance.
Using  qualitative  interviews  with  Dutch  voters,  Van  Wessel  (2010)  explicates 
paradox aspects of popular disenchantment with politics and political  parties,  where 
norms about and real experiences of the political process clash with each other. Her 
respondents expect politicians to act according to their political position and to stand up 
for their convictions if needed. When political parties and politicians fail to realize their 
promises, it is perceived as failure of their representational duty. But once politicians 
compromise or reach an agreement which does not fully realize their initial promises, it 
is felt as a betrayal to the voters, who expected "consistent" policy positions from their 
representatives. Van Wessel also reports a strong output and outcome orientation of the 
voter. Politicians should not engage in petty discussions but pragmatically solve urgent 
problems. The complexity of the political process required to reach this end is blinded 
out from the respondents' evaluation of politicians. Although these results are certainly 
limited in their potential for generalization, Van Wessel's findings nicely illustrate the 
paradoxical ways in which politicians and politics are perceived. Voters on the one hand 
expect  strong  political  leadership  and  stable  policy  positions  but  disdain  political 
conflict about issues and solutions based on trade-offs, which is perceived as a violation 
of the "contract" signed during the election (van Wessel 2010). 
All aforementioned examples illustrate that the conduct of politicians, either in the 
form of blatant corruption or as materializing in political processes is often perceived as 
a  'betrayal'  of  their  representational  responsibilities  and  damages  trust  in  political 
parties.  More  abstractly,  what  David  Easton  refers  to  as  structural  legitimacy  – 
politicians  playing  by the  rules  of  the  game and  behaving  in  a  'fair  manner'–  and 
personal legitimacy – an individual's suitability for office – is harmed. Notably,  this 
effect may occur if 'the rules of the game' are contrary to public expectations about the 
functioning of government.
H2: Corruption perception increases distrust in political parties.
Some authors claim that such trust in political institutions including political parties 
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is a “single theoretical concept” (Hooghe 2011; Marien 2011a),  hence no individual 
treatment  of  trust  in  parties,  governments,  or  other  objects  is  necessary  but  a 
comprehensive  understanding  of  the  latent  underlying  variable  of  'general'  political 
trust. Yet the variation of levels of trust expressed in certain political institutions and 
especially political parties is undeniable (see Dalton and Weldon 2005), suggesting that 
at least some institutions are perceived and evaluated differently from others. Different 
scholars (Fisher, van Heerde, and Tucker 2010; Fisher, van Heerde-Hudson, and Tucker 
2011) argue that condensing different objects of trust into a single measure bears certain 
theoretical shortcomings. Even Marien (2011a, 19) reports that trust in politicians and 
political  parties  share  a  statistical  variance,  supported  by  the  findings  of  a  factor 
analysis,  that  is  unrelated  to  the  concept  of  generalized  political  trust.  Trust  in 
politicians and political parties mus therefore be influenced by other factors. Similarly, 
Hooghe (2011) uses trust in political parties and politicians as dependent variables to 
prove that political trust can be measured on a single scale and be understood as a uni-
dimensional concept. The general assumption of their argument will not be contested in 
this  article,  since  the  focus  of  interest  is  on  political  parties  and  not  all  political 
institutions.  The  finding  that  trust  in  politicians  and  political  parties  are  correlated 
informs this paper by revealing that trust in political parties hinges on the conduct of 
politicians, who are the public faces of political parties, as outlined by Easton's concepts 
of structural and personal legitimacy. Similarly, if trust in political parties is lower than 
trust in other institutions but still related to the 'latent' concept of general political trust, 
then investigating the reasons for the variation in levels of trust is justification enough. 
Contextual variables such as features of the political  systems or other national-level 
might explain exactly these levels of variation.
 c) The influence of national and regional context
One other aspect that must be taken into consideration is the national or regional context 
that  can  influence  levels  of  trust  and  distrust.  Dalton  (2004)  for  example  analyzed 
several industrialized democracies and found that national contexts are very important 
for  the  'erosion'  of  support  in  political  institutions.  It  is  safe  to  assume  that  the 
dependent variables are to some extent influenced by factors that can not be grasped 
without  detailed  analyses  of  each  country.  Political  culture,  historical  pathways  of 
political development, cleavage structures, and other factors are likely to be amongst 
those variables. At a higher level, the region, some of these factors can be found too: 
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European countries share features such as European integration.  Central and Eastern 
European states have a common past of Communist control. South American, Asian, 
and African countries often experienced colonial rulership. 
Such national peculiarities and regional trajectories are found to have an influence on 
political  institutions  and the  mechanics  of  party systems.  Margit  Tavits  and Natalia 
Letki  (2009)  for  example  discovered  that  Eastern  European  parties  often  have  a 
'reversed' attitude towards economic spending; leftist governments in post-Communist 
countries are more likely to enforce austerity measures, while right-party governments 
are  prone  to  increase  public  spending  to  encourage  economic  growth.  Moreover, 
political parties in Eastern Europe are less institutionalized than their Western European 
counterparts,  which  benefit  from  their  mass  organizations.  Voter  representation  in 
Eastern Europe is thus dependent on other channels than a clear linkage between party 
identification and electoral choices (Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2012). 
Many South American democracies are seeing a rise of populism and party system 
de-institutionalization (Sanchez 2008, 316). This development reinforces individualized 
parties  and  a  rise  of  anti-party  sentiments  which  scorch  established  parties,  party 
systems, and representative democratic institutions (Sanchez 2008, 316). Finally, party 
systems in Africa are often weakly institutionalized and organized along ethnic lines 
(Mozaffar,  Scarritt,  and Galaich 2003; Weghorst  and Bernhard 2014, 23).  In Africa, 
Weghorst and Bernhard (2014, 10) also observe different effects of a country's colonial 
history,  depending  on  whether  colonial  rule  was  exerted  by  France  or  Britain. 
Interestingly, proportional representation in Africa is also linked with higher levels of 
volatility (Weghorst and Bernhard 2014, 24). 
In East Asia, the Left-Right dimension fails to structure party systems as it does in 
Western  countries,  where  party  systems  are  usually  polarized  along  a  Left-Right 
spectrum. Politics in the Philippines,  Korea and Taiwan are much more affected by 
personalized  parties,  regional  cleavages  or  questions  of  national  identity.  In  these 
countries, voting choices are only marginally determined by a voter's self-positioning on 
the Left-Right scale and party positions (Jou 2010).  Japan, on the other hand, has a 
clearly polarized party system, which a) highlights the relevance of national context and 
b) might be an outcome the longevity of democratic rule, as polarized party systems 
usually emerge  over  time  after  democratic  transition  and consolidation  (Dalton  and 
Tanaka  2007,  218).  Philippe  Schmitter  reminds  us  that  political  parties  in  newer 
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democracies  have  problems  acting  as  aggregators  and  intermediaries  of  societal 
demands, fail at structuring political processes, provide less identification, and offer less 
distinguishable  ideological  alternatives  (Schmitter  2001).  Hence,  the  durability  of  a 
democratic regime will also be included as a control variable, because a certain degree 
of variation of the levels of distrust can be expected between longstanding democracies 
and Second or Third Wave democracies (Kuenzi and Lambright 2001, 462–3; Sanchez 
2008, 318).  As a tentative hypothesis, it is expected that distrust in political parties is 
lower in long-established democracies than newly democratized countries.
H3: Long-established democratic regimes reduce distrust in political parties.
 d) Individual traits and trust
Besides the discussed variables that are directly linked with political objects – parties or 
authorities – other, not necessarily political orientations and factors, can affect political 
trust, because democratic government not only relies on formal political institutions and 
structures, but also on attitudes and orientations. Almond and Verba's (1963) landmark 
study  The Civic Culture  was dedicated to explore and evaluate such individual-level 
factors. They concluded that “stable democracy depends upon more than the structures 
of government and politics:  it  depends upon the orientation that people have to  the 
political process–upon the political culture” (Almond and Verba 1963, 498). The quote 
is first and foremost a reminder that the dependent variable – trust in political parties – 
can serve as an indicator for political culture and, additionally, may affect the overall  
stability  of  a  democratic  regime.  Yet  it  also  hints  at  the  necessity  to  include  some 
additional individual-level factors in the analysis. 
Interpersonal trust, for example, is often named as an important factor that generates 
political trust. Almond and Verba (1963, 490) regard such interpersonal and social trust 
as a “generalized resource that keeps a democratic polity operating. [...]  Social  trust 
facilitates  political  cooperation  among  the  citizens  in  these  nations,  and  without  it 
democratic  politics  is  impossible”.  This  trust  translates  into  political  trust,  when 
authorities  and  the  political  elite  –  of  which  political  parties  are  a  part  –  are  not  
perceived as “alien and extractive forces” (Almond and Verba 1963, 490), which relates 
to Easton's categories of personal and structural legitimacy. Other authors alternatively 
argue that interpersonal trust is unrelated to political trust (e.g. Della Porta 2000) or 
even an entirely different category of 'quasi trust' (Hardin 2002, 157). For the purpose of 
this study, the expectation that interpersonal trust is not correlated with trust in political 
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parties  is  treated  as  the  null  hypothesis.  Positively phrased,  interpersonal  trust  goes 
along with trust in political parties.
Satisfaction  with  democracy is  also  related  to  political  trust,  as  Chang  and  Chu 
(2006)  find.  Satisfaction  with  democracy can  be  understood  as  an  indicator  of  the 
perceived functioning and legitimacy of a democratic regime itself. These notions are 
related  to  perceptions  of  freedom,  fairness,  and  political  influence  (Wells  and 
Krieckhaus 2006), which also foster positive attitudes towards political objects. Hence 
an  indicator  measuring  democratic  satisfaction  will  be  included,  assuming  that 
democratic satisfaction increases trust in political parties, i.e., that satisfaction with the 
regime fosters confidence in political parties.
Economic  evaluations  and  institutional  performance,  which  indicate  the  outcome 
performance  of  a  political  system,  can  also  affect  confidence  in  political  parties 
(Anderson and Guillory 1997; Chang and Chu 2006; Marien2011b). Positive outcomes, 
i.e.,  economic  growth  or  high  income  levels,  are  expected  to  positively  affect 
confidence in political parties. For individuals, this means that earners of relatively high 
incomes  are  more  likely to  hold  positive  attitudes  towards  political  parties,  as  they 
might  perceive  their  position  as  resulting  from  beneficial  outputs  provided  by  the 
authorities. Likewise, education is a further individual-level variable affecting political 
trust. Higher educated individuals are usually more politically active and involved, as 
opposed to the higher likelihood of less-educated individuals abstaining from political 
involvement (Almond and Verba 1963, 400).
 3. METHODOLOGY
The different formulated hypotheses should be tested using individual and country-level 
variables  However,  although  a  multitude  of  surveys  measuring  trust  and  attitudes 
towards political institutions exist, the exact items required to code the dependent and 
independent variables are not wholly included in any single survey.3 Hence, aggregate 
measures for trust in parties and corruption perception will initially be utilized, which is 
a subpar approach, but nonetheless sufficient for the first aims of this study. Only in a 
final  step,  multilevel  analysis  will  be  used  to  assess  the  influence  of  country-level 
variables and individual-level variables on distrust in political parties.
3 The only survey approximating a sufficient mix of items might be the East Asian Barometer (EAB), 
but the limited scope of countries measured in the EAB clashes with the larger view envisaged for  
this study. 
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 a) Sampling and case selection
The cross-sectional analysis makes use of the 2005-08 World Values Survey dataset, 
which in total covers 57 countries. The decision to use WVS data was rooted in the 
number  of  countries  covered  with  these  surveys.  Other  more  regularly  conducted 
surveys such as the Eurobarometer only cover European countries, which bears a risk of 
unit homogeneity,  since European countries often share similar features (Ebbinghaus 
2005), while the WVS offers data on democracies worldwide. 
Amongst  these  57  countries,  all  democratic  countries  were  selected.  Democratic 
countries were chosen based on a two-criterion selection procedure using both Polity IV 
data  and  Freedom House  rankings.  Since  democracy can  be  conceived  as  a  multi-
dimensional concept with electoral democracy as one dimension, and civil liberties as 
the other (Dahl 1971), selecting cases on the basis of the two rankings makes sense and 
decreases the possibility of using cases which are not 'genuine'  democracies. Hence, 
only countries with a Polity IV DEMOC score of 6 or higher and a classification of 
"free" in the Freedom House Index at the time when the WVS survey was conducted 
were  selected.4 In  total,  35  countries  were  selected  from  the  2005-08  WVS  (see 
Appendix  A)  based  on  the  two  criteria.  This  cross-sectional  sample  from 2005-08 
included 18 countries which were OECD members and eleven which were EU member 
states at that time.
For the longitudinal analysis, data from 12 countries from all four waves conducted 
between 1995 and 2014 met the dual criterion of the Polity IV and the Freedom House 
indices. Crucial for the selection was that at least three of the four surveys included the 
item indicating the outcome variable in order to prevent large time gaps between point 
of measurement. 
 b) Measuring distrust in political parties
For  the  aggregate  analysis,  values  of  the  dependent  variable,  distrust  in  political 
parties,  were  taken  from this  the  World  Values  Survey 2005-08  data  set.  In  these 
surveys, respondents are asked how much confidence they have in different political 
and societal institutions, including political parties. The answers are coded using a four-
point interval scale with two positive values and two negative values indicating whether 
respondents trust or distrust political parties, which approximates Easton's (1965, 161-
4 Both indices were chosen because Polity IV data measures electoral accountability of public officials 
as well as institutional features of political systems, whereas CPI data focuses on political rights and  
the practice of democratic principles in the surveyed countries.
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162) recommendation to measure trust directed at political objects at least on an ordinal 
scale. The question in the World Values Survey was phrased as follows:
(V139)
“I am going to name a number of organisations. For each one, could you tell me  
how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a  
lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? Political parties:
1 A great deal 
2 Quite a lot 
3 Not very much 
4 None at all”
Both negative responses (3 and 4) were aggregated and taken as each country's level 
of total distrust. Similarly, responses indicating “not very much” (number 3) were used 
as  a  measure  for  moderate  distrust  and answer number  4 (“none at  all”)  served as 
indicators for  strong distrust.  The results are percentages of each country which show 
the proportion of respondents not trusting political parties with differing intensity. Using 
these three indicators for various levels of distrust allows for a more precise analysis on 
the national level, as some variation in the levels of the various aggregated indicators 
can be expected.
On  the  individual  level,  the  dependent  variable  is  treated  as  an  interval-scaled 
variable for use in the ordinal regression models later reported in this paper. In these 
models,  the original 4-point  scale  as asked in the survey questions was used as the 
outcome variable. No further change of the variable was made.
 c) Country-level predictors
Disproportionality  was measured using the least  square index  (LSq) introduced by 
Michael Gallagher  (1991). The index quantifies the difference between the  vote share 
gained in elections and the actual seat share in parliament, which might be the result of 
rules such as electoral thresholds or different  rules in PR and FPP systems. Using the 
Gallagher index allows for a better analysis of the impact of electoral systems on trust,  
because it is a metric variable which can be used for more types of  tests than, say, a 
nominal scaled variable distinguishing between PR, FPP, and mixed systems. Scores are 
published online by Gallagher (2013) himself. The scores used are taken from the last 
election preceding the survey which measured the dependent variable.5
Corruption  perception  as  an  indicator  for  the  independent  variable  of  personal 
5 The  LSq  index  measuring  proportionality  of  electoral  systems  is  calculated  with  the  formula
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legitimacy  was  measured  using  Transparency  International's  Corruption  Perceptions 
Index (CPI). The index is published annually since 1995 and is calculated from several 
other corruption indices, resulting in a standardized score for each country (or territory). 
Values range from 0 to 10, whereby 0 = “highly clean” and 10 = “highly corrupt”.  
Since the CPI covers most countries and goes back until 1995, it is the best available 
measure for public perception of corruption in a country.6 The country scores used here 
were taken from the CPI report in the year of the WVS survey in each country.
However,  using the  CPI,  a  national-level  index,  as  an indicator  for  the levels  of 
personal  legitimacy  is  only  a  second-best  solution.  Aarts  and  Thomassen's  (2008) 
method taking individual-level items asking about respondents about their  feeling of 
representation through politicians as independent variables is arguably a better approach 
because they would measure the individual-level predictors directly on the individual 
level.  They  therefore  approximate  Easton's  concepts  of  personal  and  structural 
legitimacy and channel failure better than the national-level CPI scores. But since the 
Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) questionnaire, which was used for the 
Aarts and Thomassen study, lacks items asking respondents about their level of trust or 
confidence in political parties, this solution is unfortunately not possible in this inquiry. 
Two  variables  measure  features  of  each  country's  party  system.  The  effective 
number of parties in parliament (Laakso and Taagepera 1979) is the first one. The 
indicator is widely accepted as a measure for party system fragmentation because it 
takes into account the number and size of parties represented in a legislature. Data is 
taken  from  Gallagher's  (2013)  dataset  which  is  available  on-line  and  covers  most 
countries  and elections worldwide.  The scores used are taken from the last  election 
preceding the survey which measured the dependent variable.7
LSq=√ 12∑ (V i−S i) ² where Vi denotes the vote share of individual parties and S i the seat 
share of the same party.
6 The Global  Corruption Barometer,  which  measures  public  perceptions  on  corruption and  is  also 
published by Transparency International, might be a more suitable indicator but covers less countries.
7 The LSq and ENP values for Ghana, Mali, and Taiwan were calculated by hand based on IBU Parline 
data (for Ghana, no vote shares were available and LSq could not be calculated). ENP is calculated  
with the formula  ENP= 1
∑ P i2
where Pi denotes the seat share parties have gained in a given 
parliament.
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Party system polarization was measured using the Polarization index developed by 
Dalton  (2008).8 Dalton originally  calculates  the  index  from  CSES  data  on  party 
positions  ranging from 0  to  10  on a  Left-Right  scale  and the  vote  shares  of  these 
political  parties  to  form a  weighted  statistic  for  party system polarization.  Extreme 
positions of small parties thus have a weaker effect on the index than extreme positions 
of parties with high vote shares. In Dalton's (2008, 906) formula, the index ranges from 
0 to 10, whereby a value of 0 indicates no polarization, i.e. all parties have a similar 
position on the Left-Right scale. A value of 10 means that all parties are positioned on 
the extremes of the political spectrum.9 For this analysis, Left-Right scores from the 
Manifesto Project Database were recoded to a 0 to 10 scale and used as the initial party 
positions on a Left-Right spectrum.
The  age of a democracy of each case was taken from Polity IV data, where it is 
called 'durability' of a regime and measured in years. The values recorded in the Polity 
IV  data  set  indicate  the  amount  of  years  a  political  regime  has  existed  without 
undergoing major institutional or other structural changes (indicated by a three-point 
change of the  Democ or  Autoc variable in the Polity IV data set). This might mean a 
transition from authoritarianism to democracy or vice versa. But since only democratic 
countries  were  sampled,  the  most  recent  regime  change  will  mean  a  democratic 
transition, or, possibly, a slight a slight deterioration of the state of a democratic regime, 
e.g., if a country's Democ score drops from 10 to 7 or lower. However, this is not the 
case  in  the  sample,  because  all  countries  in  the  sample  experienced  democratic 
transitions as a baseline for the durability indicator.
A control variable measured on the national level is GDP/capita, which checks for a 
country's income level influencing trust in political parties. Both regime durability and 
GDP per capita were included as logarithmized variables in the following statistical 
analyses, because any change of a single unit of both variables (years and current US 
dollars  PPP)  can  be  expected  to  only have  a  marginal  influence  on  the  dependent 
variable, especially towards the longer end of the value range. 
8 Dalton and Tanaka (2007) also used the index in an earlier paper.
9 The formula Dalton suggests is PI=√∑(V i)[(LRi− x̄ LR)5 ]2 where Vi   indicates each parties 
vote share and LRi the score of each party on the 1-10 Left-Right scale, and  xLR the party system 
average of the Left-Right scale.
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Finally,  'government  effectiveness'  scores  and 'voice  and  accountability'  scores 
from the World  Bank's  Worldwide Governance Indicators  (WGI) were  included.  As 
controls, they approximate national level outcomes of the political system and public 
influence in  and transparency of  decision-making.10 In  total,  eight  indicators  on the 
country level were collected. While it would be theoretically reasonable to include more 
independet variables or control variables in the model, the sample size of 35 countries 
limited the amount of variables.
 d) Individual-level predictors
In  order  to  measure  the  impact  of  country-level  predictors  (that  is,  party  system 
variables) on the individual-level outcome variable that is trust in political parties, a 
multilevel model will subsequently be used. Multilevel models seek to explain variation 
among individuals who can be divided into different groups, which is why multilevel 
models are sometimes called hierarchical models (see Steenbergen and Jones 2002 for 
an introduction in multilevel analysis). Multilevel models distinguish between Level-1 
and Level-2 variables, the former on the individual level and the latter on the group 
level. Multilevel analysis prevents analytical flaws that occur when group members are 
the  unit  of  analysis,  which  requires  a  technique  that  is  mindful  of  “unit-wise 
heterogeneity” (Jones 2008, 607), and is therefore the most suitable statistical approach.
For  the  given  proposal,  the  second  level  is  the  country-level,  in  which  the 
respondents of the WVS reside. The influence of group membership and features of 
these groups are thus treated as a second-level independent variables. Similar models 
have been used to analyze corruption perception (Chang and Chu 2006), the relationship 
between political institutions and satisfaction with democracy (Wells and Krieckhaus 
2006; Aarts and Thomassen 2008) or the influence of electoral systems on political trust 
(Marien 2011b), to list just a few. 
The indicator for education was taken from the WVS dataset and coded on a scale 
ranging  from  1  (=  no  formal  education)  to  9  (=  university  degree  or  similar). 
Interpersonal trust is measured with a dichotomous variable with the possible answers 
that 'most people can be trusted' (code: 0) or that one 'can´t be too careful' when dealing 
10 The  'voice  and  accountability'  index  is  influenced  by  trust  in  parliament  and  satisfaction  with 
democracy scores,  which some (Marien  2011;  Hooghe 2011)  say are related  to  trust  in  political 
parties.  Hence,  if  the  influence  of  these  factors  is  strong  enough  in  the  final  index,  a  positive 
relationship between the index and the DV can be expected.
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with other people (code: 1). Democratic satisfaction is measured with a ten-point scale 
(where 1 = “not at all democratic”; 10 = “completely democratic”) indicator. The model 
also incorporated standard control variables such as age, gender (0 = female; 1 = male), 
and the self-positioning on a Left-Right scale ranging from 1 = left to 10 = right. 
Unfortunately,  the  WVS questionnaire  lacks  specific  items  to  measure  economic 
evaluations  and  performance  of  government  at  the  individual  level.  Institutional 
performance and economic evaluations can only be assessed by conceiving household 
income and  the  earlier  mentioned  country-level  variables  of  GDP/capita and 
government efficiency as proxy indicators for these two variables.  
 4. RESULTS
The analysis was conducted in several steps. First, the level of distrust over time in a 
number of cases is presented. Only by this means, trends in the levels of distrust can be 
tracked and the question whether trust is declining be answered. Second, the hypotheses 
regarding the influence  of  corruption  perception  and the  proportionality of  electoral 
systems are tested using the two outcome variables calculated from the WVS 2005-08 
dataset and the independent variables presented earlier. In a third and final step, the 
influence of the individual-level and country-level independent variables on individual-
level  attitudes  (i.e.  trust  in  political  parties)  is  tested  by the  means  of  a  multilevel 
analysis.
 a) Longitudinal evidence: distrust over time
The  most  valid  evidence  supporting  the  “de-alignment  hypothesis”  is  the  gradual 
decline of party membership, party identification, and electoral turnout in a number of 
established democracies. In order to test the validity of the de-alignment hypothesis for 
the outcome variable of trust in political parties, data from the four World Value Surveys 
conducted between 1995 and 2014 was collected and analyzed.  Figure 1 presents the 
development of distrust in political parties in those 19 years for the 13 countries which 
participated in more than two of the World Values Surveys. The left panels shows the 
development  of total  distrust  and the right  panels displays  strong distrust.  European 
countries are display in the top row, and all other in the bottom row. Moderate distrust is 
not included, as it is the difference of strong distrust subtracted from total distrust on a 
country-by-country basis.
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Figure 1: National levels of distrust over time
Source: Own calculations based own World Values Survey data. 
Top row displays European democracies and the bottom row non-European democracies. Missing WVS4 
scores for Australia, Germany, New Zealand, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Sweden, and Uruguay were 
calculated by forming an average from WVS3 and WVS5 results (WVS3 1995-1998, WVS4 1999-
2000, WVS5 2005-2008, WVS6 2010-2014).
The first observations striking the eye is that the overall levels of distrust is relatively 
high. Total distrust averages between 81 and 77 percent for all four waves. The highest 
score is  found in New Zealand during the third WVS wave with a  staggering 93.9 
percent. Sweden during the last wave reports the lowest level with 55.51 percent. Strong 
distrust,  which is  also included in the total  distrust  scores and displayed in  the two 
panels on the right, never falls below 26 percent on average. In other words, at least a 
quarter of respondents across all countries does 'not at all' trust political parties. 
What is also evident from these figures is the only incremental change of distrust 
across the four different WVS waves. On average, total distrust in the thirteen selected 
countries declined by 3.2 percent from 81 percent during the third World Value Survey 
(1995-98) to 77.6 percent in the last wave (2010-14). There is, however, considerable 
variation  when  looking  at  individual  countries.  Germany,  New Zealand,  Japan,  and 
Sweden,  experience a  decline of total  distrust  of ranging from eleven to 17 percent 
between the third and sixth wave. The United States, Chile, and Slovenia to the contrary 
have rising levels of total distrust with an increase of roughly seven percent. 
A different development of strong distrust in political parties can be seen in the right 
panels. The average of strong distrust remained roughly the same between the third and 
sixth survey (26.5 and 26.8 percent,  respectively).  Only some countries – Australia, 
Romania, Slovenia, and the United States – report rising levels of strong distrust. In 
New Zealand, strong distrust even decreased by 19.5 percent. In most other countries, 
the overall levels stagnated. 
In  order  to  explore  the  effect  and  the  statistical  significance  of  the  longitudinal 
aspect,  linear regressions using the respective survey waves (coded from 0 to 3) as 
independent  variable  and  the  percentages  of  strong  and  total  distrust  as  dependent 
variable were used. Total distrust has a coefficient of B = -1.004, which resembles the 
findings reported above (p = 0.380; SE = 1.133).  R² of the model is  merely 0.015. 
Strong distrust resulted in a larger coefficient (B = -3.369, SE = 2.835) that also fails to 
reach statistical significance (p = 0.240). R² of the strong distrust regression is 0.027. 
The de-alignment hypothesis claims that people are becoming increasingly disaffected 
from political parties. Both models illustrate, however, that opposed to common belief, 
time plays no relevant role for distrust in political parties.
But besides the general trend for the time from 1995 to 2014, changes between the 
two most  recent  waves between 2008 and 2014 are interesting,  too,  because of  the 
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potential influence of the Global/European Financial Crisis. Distrust was already high 
prior to the economic downturn which limits the potential effects of the crisis. At least 
total  distrust  remained  almost  entirely  unchanged,  even  decreasing  by  2.9  percent. 
Strong distrust, on the other hand, rose slightly in the given sample, although by a mere 
0.29  percent.  In  individual  countries,  though,  more  significant  changes  could  be 
observed.  Strong  distrust  in  Spain  and  Slovenia  surged  by  14  and  17  percent, 
respectively. It also increased in Australia (7.1 percent), Romania (5.6 percent), and the 
United States (4.5 percent). The largest decline of strong distrust was seen in Germany, 
where  a  decrease  of  18  percent  took place  between the  last  two surveys.  In  Chile, 
Poland, and South Korea, a less attenuated decrease of roughly six percent occurred. 
These marked hikes and decreases in strong distrust between the 2005-08 and 2010-14 
World  Value  Survey waves  suggest  that  changes  in  individual  countries  are  heavily 
contingent on domestic factors, such as a government's management of the crisis, and 
not part of a universal trend towards increasingly skeptical populaces.
In sum, using distrust in political parties as a measure for citizen de-alignment does 
not  indicate  a  worsening  development,  even  if  distrust  levels  are  already  high  on 
average.  Much  to  the  contrary,  distrust  measured  both  as  total  and  strong  distrust 
slightly decreased across the sampled countries during the observed time frame. What 
these numbers tell is first, that there is no universal trend towards higher distrust over 
the last 20 years, and second, that numbers and changes between survey waves vary 
markedly among individual countries, indicating that trust in political  parties is to a 
large extent mediated by domestic factors or current events. Similarly, it can safely be 
inferred  that  the  slight  decline  of  total  distrust  is  mostly  caused  by a  decrease  of 
moderate distrust (not shown).
 b) Aggregated levels of trust, cross-sectional
Let's now turn to the WVS 2005-08 data and the influence of national-level variables on 
the overall levels of trust in the 35 countries under scrutiny. This analysis is conducted 
in three steps. First, the overall levels of total trust, moderate distrust, and strong distrust 
are  assessed  descriptively.  Second,  the  influence  of  the  national-level  variables  is 
evaluated  variable  by  variable,  using  scatterplots  of  the  existing  data.  Finally,  a 
multivariate regression is used to determine the strength of the influence of all variables 
in a single model.
Figure 2 presents the overall levels of trust in the 35 selected countries of the 2005-
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08 World Value Survey. The stacked bar graph consists of each country's aggregated 
responses  of  the  four-point  trust  scale.  It  presents  an  interesting  picture:  answers 
indicating  moderate  distrust  in  political  parties  make up the largest  share  in  almost 
every country. They are followed by the response strong distrust/“none at all” and "quite 
a  lot",  which  are  almost  even.  "A great  deal"  of  confidence  is  reported  in  a  small  
minority  of  countries;  only  India,  Ghana,  Mali,  Cyprus,  and  South  Africa  express 
mentionable levels of high confidence. 
Most  countries  display a  level  of  total  distrust  between 60 and up to  almost  80 
percent. People in the majority of countries included in the sample are very skeptical 
towards political parties. Total distrust is very high in countries such as Peru, Poland, 
Romania, Slovenia, and Argentina where the aggregated measure even transcends the 
90 percent mark. Moderate distrust is high in almost every country. Yet, high levels of 
strong distrust are mostly visible in countries with comparatively lower levels of socio-
economic development, countries with recent experience of political crises, and/or Third 
Wave democracies. These are, for example, Romania, Trinidad and Tobago, Ukraine, 
Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Peru, Poland, Taiwan, Slovenia, and Mexico. Yet, 
Germany and France also report high levels of strong distrust, indicating that this is not 
a homogenous group. On the other extreme, countries such as Ghana, India, Indonesia, 
and South Africa express relatively low levels of distrust (total, moderate, and strong), 
similar  to  the  Nordic  countries  of  Sweden,  Norway,  and Finland,  which  report  the 
lowest levels of strong distrust in political parties.
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Figure 2: Responses per country
Source: World Values Survey 2005-08
Broken down into different regions, an interesting picture emerges.  Figure 3 shows 
the regional (unweighted) average response of distrust in political parties. Note that the 
highest (=4) value indicates strong distrust and the lowest value (=1) “a great deal” of 
trust in political parties. Regionally, Middle and South America (x = 3.22), as well as 
Eastern Europe (x = 3.24)  show the highest average levels of distrust. Located in the 
center are North America and Oceania (x = 2.98), Western Europe (x = 2.96), and Asia 
(x = 2.90). African respondents on average reported the lowest level of distrust (x = 
2.72). However, standard deviation is highest in Africa (SD = 0.933) and Asia (SD = 
0.830), meaning that these two regions are also the least homogenous ones in terms of 
confidence in political  parties. Regional contexts therefore have an influence on the 
levels of trust in political parties. Especially in post-authoritarian Eastern Europe and 
Middle and South America, distrust in political parties is extensive.
 c) Sample variability
The high variation in the dependent variable is confirmed by the statistics reported in 
Table 1. Aggregated total distrust is lowest in India (53.6 percent) and highest in Peru 
(95.3 percent). Respondents in Mali (31.4 percent) reported the lowest level of moderate 
distrust, whereas their counterparts in the United States expressed the highest level (68.8 
percent).  Strong distrust  is  lowest  in Norway (6.4 percent)  and peaks in  Peru (49.9 
percent). On average, 50.25 percent of the respondents in all countries answered the 
question with "not much", 27.62 with "none at all", resulting in an average total distrust 
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Figure 3: Distrust in political parties: regional differences
Notes:
(a) Error bars represent +/- 1 standard deviation.
(b) North America/Oceania = US, CA, AU, NZ. Central/South America = PE, CL, AR, BR, MX, TT, UY. Africa  
= GH, ML, ZA. Western Europe =  CY, FI, FR, DE, GB, IT, NL, NO, ES, SE, CH. Eastern Europe = BG, PL,  
RO, SI, UA. Asia = IN, ID, JP, KR, TW.
Source: World Values Survey 2005-2008
level of 77.87 percent. 
The independent variables are displayed in a similar fashion. On average, countries 
have  ENP scores  of  3.89  'effective  parties'.  Mali  scores  lowest  with  1.59  effective 
parties,  which suggests  a  dominant-party system. Brazil,  on the other  hand,  has  the 
highest score of 9.32 and thus a highly fragmented party system. The standard deviation 
is 1.75, meaning that most countries roughly have between 2 and 6 effective parties and 
by that a two-party system (with possible smaller third parties) or a moderately pluralist 
party system.
The Gallagher index (LSq) averages at 5.95 with a median at 4.35 (SD = 5.05). This 
suggests  a  slightly  skewed  distribution  with  outliers  at  the  far  end.  And  indeed, 
countries using rather disproportional electoral systems such as France with a score of 
21.95 and Great Britain (LSq = 16.73) are the most extreme cases. To the other end, 
South Africa, scoring a 0.26, has the most proportional electoral system.
Party  system  polarization  was  measured  using  Dalton's  (2008)  formula  for  22 
countries where sufficient information about parties' positions on a Left-Right scale was 
available from the Party Manifesto Project. The calculated values range from Ukraine = 
0.15 to  Japan = 9.10.  A mean of 2.90 and a median of 2.22 imply that most party 
systems in the sample are only moderately polarized along the Left-Right Dimension. A 
certain problem of the individually calculated scores is  the difference from Dalton's 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics (national-level)
Source: Own calculations.
N MIN MAX Median SD
35 37.4 31.4 68.8 50.3 51.3 10.75
35 43.5 6.4 49.9 27.6 26.4 12.24
35 41.7 53.6 95.3 77.9 79.0 10.81
ENP 35 7.73 1.59 9.32 3.89 3.76 1.75
34 21.69 .26 21.95 5.95 4.35 5.05
CPI 35 7.2 2.4 9.6 5.9 5.9 2.42
35 71.2 27.8 99.0 74.3 80.0 21.33
35 58.7 41.3 100.0 77.5 81.3 17.53
35 192 5 197 48 23 48.31
35 72,334 451 72,785 20,545 16,023 18267.26
22 9.05 .05 9.10 2.90 2.22 2.56
Range Mean
Mod. Distrust (%)
Strong distrust (%)
Total distrust (%)
Lsq
Efficiency
Accountability
Durability
GDP/cap
Polarization
original results. Germany's and Japan's party systems are amongst the most polarized in 
this  sample,  although  having  only  average  scores  in  Dalton's  sample.  Hence,  the 
external validity of the procedure to calculate scores utilized here is questionable.11
Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index has an average of 5.87 and 
a median score of 5.90. Since the CPI is measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 10, this 
indicates a slight tendency towards "clean” CPI scores of the sample. The lowest score, 
though, is recorded for Indonesia (CPI = 2.4), which indicates a relatively high level of 
corruption. The maximum score is shared by Finland and New Zealand (CPI = 9.6).
Scores for government efficiency range from 27.80 to 99.00, with a mean of 74.33 
and a median score of 80.00. Accountability scores taken from the same WGI data-set 
range from 41.30 to 100 (mean = 77.49, median = 81.30). These differences suggest that 
the observed countries have a slightly higher overall score in government accountability 
than government efficiency.
In terms of regime durability, the countries included in the sample display a high 
variation. The lowest value is 5 years for Peru, while the US occupies the maximum at 
197 years. Hence, the mean (47.51 years) differs significantly from the median (23.00 
years).  Standard  deviation  and  variance  also  display  the  very  heterogeneous 
composition of the sample in terms of regime durability.
Finally,  income as  measured  in  GDP per  capita  (PPP,  current  US$)  is  even  less 
homogeneously distributed throughout the sample. Lowest annual income is found in 
Mali at $450.85 and highest for Norway with an average income of $72,784.95 per year. 
The  sample  is  skewed  towards  the  lower/middle  income  countries  with  a  mean  = 
20545.11 and the median = 16,022.94. Transforming both GDP per capita and regime 
durability to a logarithmic scale reduces the heterogeneity of both variables and results 
in a distribution more akin to a bell curve. 
 d) Aggregate-level bivariate effects
Figure 4 shows the bivariate effects of all eight predictor variables on total and strong 
distrust  at  the  country  level.  When  contrasted  with  total  distrust  (top  row),  ENP, 
Polarization index, CPI, government efficiency and government accountability, and the 
11 Compare for instance Germany's scores (2.70) or Japan's scores (3.30) using Dalton's (2008, 907) 
method with the results  here (6.98 and 9.10,  respectively)  for  the same legislatures.  One of  the 
sources to obtain the polarization scores, either CSES survey data or Manifesto Project data, therefore 
produces results with questionable validity.
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logarithmized durability variable result in almost horizontal trend lines for total distrust 
and  produce  statistically  insignificant  p-values.  This  means  that  all  these  predictor 
variables  do  not  or  only  marginally  affect  total  distrust.  The  LSq  index  and 
logarithmized GDP per capita, on the other hand, have a positive effect on total distrust. 
LSq also is the only variable that reaches a level of statistical significance (p = 0.052). 
One interesting observation about the distribution of the LSq-to-total-distrust panel is 
that total distrust rapidly increases at LSq scores between 0 and 10 but stays on a certain 
level afterward, which might imply that disproportionality only affects distrust up to a 
certain level and ceases to affect the outcome variable once disproportionality reaches a 
certain cut point. The findings cast doubt on Marien's (2011b) hypothesis that electoral 
systems affect political trust in the form of a curvilinear function and rather support the 
expectation  formulated  earlier  that  disproportionality  has  an  almost  linear  effect  on 
distrust in political parties.
For the strong distrust (bottom row) measure, effect directions are more varied. Two 
distinct patterns can be identified. First, some variables affect strong distrust positively, 
with a minimally inclined slope, as in the cases of ENP, LSq index, and Polarization 
index, although all effects are insignificant. The positive effect is strongest for the LSq 
and  ENP  variables.  Second,  the  other  variables  –  CPI,  government  efficiency  & 
accountability, regime durability, and GDP per capita – have a negative influence on 
strong distrust and reach statistical significance (p < 0.05). 
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Figure 4: Effects of predictor variables (bivariate)
Source: Own compilation.
R = .336
P  = .052
R = .065
P  = .712
R = .064
P  = .777
R = -.020
P  = .911
R = .039
P  = .823
R = .090
P  = .607
R = -.033
P  = .852
R = .265
P  = .125
R = .252
P  = .151
R = .160
P  = .358
R = .128
P  = .571
R = -.579
P  = .000
R = -.512
P  = .002
R = -.477
P  = .004
R = -.604
P  = .000
R = -.401
P  = .017
Without displaying the bivariate effects of each predictor on moderate distrust, one 
important  inference  can  be  made  from  a  simple  mathematical  exercise.  For  the 
independent variables where total distrust results in a horizontal trend line and strong 
distrust in a positively inclined one, moderate distrust will have the inverse direction of 
the  strong  distrust  line.  Therefore,  increasing  CPI,  Government  efficiency  and 
accountability, logarithmized durability, and GDP per capita cause a decrease of strong 
distrust whilst simultaneously increasing moderate distrust in political parties. Only via 
the disaggregation of the dependent variable, this particular pattern could be revealed. A 
mere analysis of composite distrust would have suffered from a loss of information as a 
result of aggregation. 
These findings  suggest  that  'cleaner',  older,  richer,  and efficient  democracies  will 
suffer from less strong distrust than their younger, more corrupt, less affluent, and less 
efficient counterparts. Countries with disproportional representation and fragmented or 
polarized party systems are more likely to face strong distrust by their citizens. Yet the 
findings  also  highlight  that  total  distrust  is  almost  unaffected  by  the  mentioned 
independent variables. Apparently, total distrust rather plateaus at a high level, without 
being affected by most country-level predictors. Similar levels of total distrust can be 
found for two-party systems as well as for multiparty systems, for corrupt and for clean 
countries, as well as for old and new democracies. It is mainly strong distrust (and, 
inversely, moderate distrust) that is determined by the various predictors.
 e) Aggregate-level multivariate effects
Because  the  scatterplots  presented  above  only  demonstrate  bivariate  relationships 
between the predictor variables and each outcome variable, a multivariate regression 
was used to  assess  the effects  of each independent  variable  in a  single model.  The 
results are reported in Table 2. Note that only ENP, LSq index, CPI, regime durability 
(logarithmized), and government efficiency were included as predictors. The decision to 
exclude  government  accountability  and  GDP  per  capita  was  caused  by  strong 
multicollinearity between  these  three  and other  independent  variables.  A correlation 
matrix  revealed  that  government  accountability  correlates  highly  with  government 
efficiency (r = 0.949) and CPI (r = 0.931). Similarly, GDP per capita strongly correlates 
with CPI, government efficiency, and government accountability (for all three: r > 0.8). 
Dalton's index of party system polarization was omitted because of the low number of 
cases (NPI = 22) for which the variable could be calculated. A further reduction of the 
27
already small sample would have decreased the already limited feasibility of the sample 
for statistical analysis. 
First, two independent multivariate regressions were run with the original indicators; 
one each for the outcome variables of strong and total distrust. The two columns on the 
left side of Table 2 show the results of these regressions. The results for both outcome 
variables roughly resemble the patterns displayed in the bivariate analysis. That is, the 
direction  of  effects  changes  with  the  outcome  variable.  Using  total  distrust  as  the 
outcome variable  resulted  in  smaller  and less  significant  coefficients  for  ENP,  CPI, 
logarithmized durability,  and government  efficiency,  indicating  that  changes  in  total 
distrust cannot be predicted well by the model. Additionally, R² (0.131) and F (0.842) of 
the total distrust model also imply a low explanatory power. 
The model using strong distrust as an outcome variable produced decent R² (0.519) 
and F (6.044) values, which suggests that the independent variables predict the levels of 
strong distrust  better  than total  distrust.  Moreover,  disproportionality and regime are 
statistically significant (p < 0.05). A reason for concern, though, are the relatively high 
28
Table 2: Effects of predictor variables (multivariate regression)
Notes: 
(a) All entries are unstandardized coefficients. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
(b) VIFCPI = 6.660 
(c) VIFDC = 6.531
ENP
- -
- -
- -
R² .519 .131 .430 .176
F 6.044 .842 5.475 1.549
N 34 34 34 34
Standard model Factor model
Strong distrust Total distrust Strong distrust Total distrust
B
(SE)
B
(SE)
B
(SE)
B
(SE)
(Constant) 36.612***(10.061)
72.038***
(11.646)
32.329**
(12.894)
87.693***
(13.350)
1.383
(1.012)
.609
(1.172)
1.040
(1.065)
.398
(1.103)
Lsq .791**(.333)
.765*
(.385)
.731**
(.356)
.801**
(.369)
CPIb -2.325(1.825)
-.650
(2.112)
-2.233
(1.873)
-2.642
(1.939)
Log(Durability) -12.760**(5.543)
-1.455
(6.415)
Efficiency .151(.219)
.070
(.254)
Democracy 
Componentc
-1.741
(4.440)
6.015
(4.597)
standard errors in the two models, which are problematic for the inferential power of a 
statistical model. Smaller standard errors are desirable, because they suggest that the 
observations  made  in  the  sample  are  close  to  observations  that  will  be  made  in  a 
population. In the given models, the high standard errors, sometimes even larger than 
the coefficients, indicate that the observations are not explained well by the statistical 
model.12
Problematic, too, is that most coefficients are statistically insignificant, except for the 
positive  influence  of  Gallagher's  LSq index and logarithmized regime durability  on 
strong distrust (for bot p < 0.05 ).13 Judging only by the effects found for ENP, LSq and 
CPI,  two  observations  can  be  made.  First,  a  high  number  of  parties  and  a 
disproportional electoral system are related to higher percentage of strong distrust in 
political parties. This effect, though, is somewhat mitigated by a high coefficient of the 
CPI. Because higher scores of the CPI express lower corruption, a negative sign in front 
of  the  regression  coefficient  is  exactly  the  outcome  hypothesized  in  the  beginning. 
Additionally, older regimes have a moderating effect on strong distrust, as highlighted 
by the negative sign in front of the durability coefficient. In sum, using countries as the 
unit of analysis, disproportional electoral systems will increase the statistical probability 
of  populaces  expressing  strong distrust,  while  a  higher  age  of  a  democratic  regime 
decreases the same probability.
Additionally,  another  two regressions  were run using a  single variable  calculated 
through a Principal Component Analysis which replaced regime durability, government 
efficiency, government accountability, and GDP per capita. The purpose was to reduce 
the effect of collinear predictors, because all four listed variables load strongly (factor 
loads  between 0.828 and 0.965)  on a  single component  (Eigenvalue = 3.503,  58.38 
percent of variance explained). The CPI was omitted from this component because the 
focus  of  research  is  on  the  individual  influence  of  corruption  perception  on  trust.  
Likewise, ENP and LSq also load on a second component with an Eigenvalue = 1.215 
12 This view is for  instance maintained by  King (1986, 676–7),  who pointed out that  R² only has 
limited meaning for the explanatory power of test  results.  Instead, standard errors provide better 
insights about the inferential power of a model.
13 It  is  important  to  mention  that  small-N  samples  usually  produce  non-significant  results  in  test  
statistics, since the sample size is too small to infer on values for a larger population, which, however, 
does not mean that effect sizes should be ignored, but that a more cautious interpretation of the results 
is required (Kramer and Rosenthal 1999).
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(20.26 percent of variance explained), but were included as individual variables because 
of the potential influence of the variables themselves. Also, correlation between ENP 
and LSq is still acceptable (r = -0.245). The results are reported in the two columns on 
the  right  of  Table  2 (“factor  models”,  the  newly  generated  variable  is  listed  as 
“democracy  component”,  as  it  mostly  describes  features  of  stable  and  functioning 
democracies).
The coefficients of ENP and LSq remain mostly unchanged in their direction and 
size.  As in  the first  two models,  LSq is  the only independent  variable  that  reaches 
statistical significance in the models forecasting strong and total distrust (p < 0.05). The 
coefficient for CPI remains most stable in the strong distrust model. For total distrust, 
the coefficient of CPI even increases by from -0.651 in the standard model to -2.642 in 
the  factor  model.  The  component  variable  has  a  strong  and  significant  effect  on 
moderate distrust and a negative influence on strong distrust. All factors included in the 
component therefore diminish the probability for a country to report higher levels of 
strong distrust. However, CPI and the component both have a high Variance Inflation 
Factor (VIF > 6.5), which highlights the strong collinearity between both variables. This 
finding  might  also  explain  the  erratic  behavior  of  the  coefficient  of  CPI  and  other 
variables in the models. In overall terms, the two factor models using the 'democracy 
component' have roughly the same R² values as the two standard models, suggesting 
that the explanatory power of them is similar.
As overall results, the multivariate analysis revealed that a) strong distrust can be 
predicted more precisely than total distrust with the variables used here, and that b) the 
disaggregation of total distrust helps to detect the effects of the different variables. With 
regards  to  the  effects  of  individual  predictors,  c)  higher  ENP scores  correlate  with 
higher levels of strong distrust, d) higher disproportionality measured with Gallagher's 
LSq index correlates positively with strong distrust, that e) 'cleaner' CPI scores correlate 
negatively with strong distrust but have mixed effects on moderate and total distrust, 
and that f) older regimes will face less strong distrust. In other words, total distrust on 
the  country  level  stays,  statistically,  unaffected  by  the  predictor  variables.  This 
evidence correspond with the results of the bivariate analysis: the more disproportional 
an electoral system is, and the higher the fragmentation of a party system, the higher 
will be the strong distrust of the electorate. Moreover, the age of a democratic regime, 
i.e. the further a democracy is consolidated over time, translates itself directly into less 
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strong distrust in political parties, at a statistically significant level.14
 f) Multilevel regression
Lastly,  all  theoretically  relevant  variables  were  used  in  a  multilevel  model  that 
incorporates the effects of individual-level (L1) and country-level (L2) predictors. The 
employed technique was a multilevel ordinary logistic regression and was calculated 
using STATA's meologit command. One advantage of this additional analysis is that the 
independent variable could be inserted with its original four-point scale. The results are 
reported  in  Table  3.  Note  that  not  all  variables  were  used.  Certain  predictors– 
government accountability, GDP per capita, and party system polarization – were again 
omitted because of strong multicollinearity and a high amount of missing values. The 
most relevant variables to test the formulated hypotheses were nonetheless included in 
the model.15
The results displayed in Table  3 reveal that of the individual-level predictors, only 
two variables have a statistically significant effect on confidence in political parties. 
Interpersonal trust and democratic satisfaction exert a strong influence on confidence in 
political parties. The relatively high and negative coefficient of both variables indicates 
that people who rather distrust others are also much more likely to have low confidence 
in political parties, or, positively phrased, people who trust others are also more likely to 
be confident in political parties. Similarly, respondents who voice higher satisfaction 
with democracy are more likely to trust political parties than those being dissatisfied 
with the state of democracy in their country. 
Higher levels of education increase the likelihood of respondents distrusting political 
parties. Income, on the other hand, has a slightly negative effect on distrust, meaning 
that respondents living in higher income households will display higher trust in political 
14 A remark on the sample size and statistical significance, the robustness of the models the used here,  
and thereby the results, is questionable due to the small N of the sample, the amount of predictor  
variables and the influence of multicollinearity. 
15 On a side note, logistic regression results report coefficients that indicate the change in the odds of a  
value change of the dependent variable. A negative estimate means that a respondents with higher 
scores of the predictor variable are more likely to answer with lower values (more trusting) of the 
outcome variable.  Conversely,  positive estimates mean that respondents with higher scores of the 
predictor variable are more likely to have answered in a higher category (more distrusting) of the 
outcome  variable.  The  coefficients  cannot  be  interpreted  as  linear  effects  of  the  independent 
variables.
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parties. Both effects are statistically significant, but the size of the coefficients implies 
that the influence is rather small. Gender, age, and Left-Right placement also resulted in 
very small and statistically insignificant coefficient. All hypothesized relationships on 
the individual level are supported by this result and are not affected by control variables, 
especially the expectations for interpersonal trust and democratic satisfaction.
At the national level, LSq and logarithmized regime durability resulted in significant 
coefficients  (for  both  p  =  0.018).  Therefore,  respondents  from  countries  with 
disproportional electoral systems are more likely to distrust political parties. Durability 
resulted in a negative effect which indicates that the longevity of a democratic regime 
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Table 3: Multilevel model
Notes:
(a) ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
(b) LR test vs. ologit regression:   chibar2(01) =  1471.31 Prob>=chibar2 = 0.0000
SE z
.026 -13.48
.005 -35.01
.025*** .006 4.26
.005 -3.64
.001 -1.35
.036 .022 1.61
.005 -1.47
.279 -2.36
.039** .017 2.37
.028 .051 .54
.012 .096 .12
.009 .011 .82
-4.972 .113 -44.04
-2.655*** .109 -24.42
.107 -1.55
.207 .053
Wald Chi² 1,570.99
29,729
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Predictor Coefficient Individual level
Interpersonal trust -.354***
Democraticness -.192***
Education
Income -.019***
Age -.001
Gender (male)
Left-Right -.008
N
ational level
LogDurable -.657**
Lsq
ENP
CPI
Efficiency
/cutpoint 1
/cutpoint 2
/cutpoint 3 -.166
/country variance
N level 1
N level 2
has  an  effect  that  mitigates  distrust  in  political  parties.  ENP,  CPI,  and  government 
efficiency have positive coefficients, although not on a statistically significant level. 
Finally, the variance of country fixed effects is 0.207, which suggests that country group 
membership at least affects trust in political  parties. A variance close to zero would 
mean that group membership does not affect confidence in political parties. Variation on 
the country-level that could not be grasped with the given predictor variables thus exists 
within the model.
Only  the  hypothesized  relationships  between  distrust  and  disproportionality,  and 
between distrust and regime durability can be supported by the model, even if the effect 
appears small for disproportionality. Corruption perception on the national level has no 
significant effect on trust in political parties. It is unclear though, whether this is a result 
of  methodological  shortcomings,  as  mentioned  before,  such  as  including  correlated 
predictor variables in the model, or if national-level measures for corruption perception 
indeed fail to explain individual-level attitudes. After all, it is not unimaginable that an 
individual's  perception  of  corruption  is  unaffected  by national-level  surveys.  In  lay 
terms, expert surveys ranking countries on their corruption levels might be detached 
from the individual perception of politicians and parties that make up the perception of 
personal  and  structural  legitimacy.  Unfortunately,  this  problem  persists  until  more 
suitable  survey  data  is  available  which  includes  individual-level  items  covering 
perceived corruption or misconduct of politicians, the satisfaction with representation 
through political parties,  as well as items inquiring about a respondent's confidence in 
political  parties.  Hence,  the hypothesis  that  corruption perception affects  individual-
level  trust  in  political  parties  should  not  entirely  be  rejected,  even  if,  statistically 
speaking, the null hypothesis must favored.
Finally,  another stated intention of the analysis was to detect the influence of the 
number of parties on trust in political parties. Using the Effective Number of Parties as 
an  indicator  for  this  party  system feature,  it  was  found  that  ENP and  distrust  are 
positively  linked,  i.e.  that  a  higher  number  of  parties  in  parliament  correlates  with 
higher levels of distrust in political parties, but not statistically significant. There is thus 
no supporting  evidence  for  a  better  acceptance  of  two-party systems or  multi-party 
systems.
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 5. SUMMARY
The starting point of the study was the question if trust or, better, distrust in political 
parties is changing over time, whether party and electoral systems affect these levels, 
and how perceptions of misconduct  and corruption influence these perceptions.  The 
formal hypotheses were:
H1: Disproportionality of electoral systems generates distrust political parties.
H2: Corruption perception increases distrust in political parties.
H3: Long-established democratic regimes reduce distrust in political parties .
The first hypothesis (H1) was confirmed with statistically significant effects at the 
individual and national level and it can confidently be claimed that disproportionality 
boosts distrust in political parties. H2 could not be supported. Only a bivariate effect of 
corruption perception that lowers strong distrust was found. H3 was supported, because 
the age of a democratic significantly affects strong distrust on the national level, and 
also reduces distrust on the individual level.
Moreover,  several tentative hypotheses about the relationships between dependent 
and independent variables were formulated based on less clear theoretical grounds or 
from the results of previous research:
» Higher party system fragmentation generates distrust in political parties. 
» Higher party system polarization generates distrust in political parties.
» Higher democratic satisfaction reduces distrust in political parties. 
» Interpersonal trust reduces distrust in political parties.
» Better education reduces distrust in political parties.
» Higher income reduces distrust in political parties.
The first two expectations, party system fragmentation and polarization increasing 
distrust in political parties, could not be confirmed with statistically significant effects, 
even though higher  ENP scores  indicate  higher  distrust.  At  the individual  level,  the 
tentative  hypotheses  describing  the  influence  of  democratic  satisfaction  and 
interpersonal trust are supported by the statistical tests. Notably, education has a reverse 
effect: better  education does not entail  more trust  but more distrust.  Higher income, 
though, reduces distrust as hypothesized.
To wrap up, longitudinal data from World Values Surveys between 1995 and 2014 
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level
also demonstrated that distrust in political parties languishes at a generally high level 
and is not increasing. The cross-sectional analysis of the aggregated levels of strong and 
total distrust showed that total distrust is hardly affected by any of the chosen predictor 
variables,  be it  CPI,  government  efficiency,  regime durability,  number of parties,  or 
party  system  polarization.  Disaggregating  the  data  was  thus  a  reasonable  choice, 
because the explanatory power of each predictor is much higher when contrasted with 
strong distrust. 
 6. DISCUSSION
The  potentially  negative  effects  of  anti-party  sentiments  have  been  stressed  by 
numerous  scholars  (Poguntke  1996,  Dalton  and  Weldon  2005,  Webb  2005).  Albeit 
constrained by certain empirical  and methodological  limitations,  this  study provided 
ample evidence that electoral systems indeed affect confidence in political parties on the 
national level and on the individual level, although with varying effect sizes. It was also 
found  individual-level  orientations  –  trusting  other  people  and  deeming  one's  own 
country democratic – accompany each other. 
One aspect unaffected by the results is the effect of distrust in political parties. While 
the aforementioned authors demonstrate negative outcomes, other scholars maintain that 
critical  attitudes  towards  political  institutions  are  an  inherent  feature  of  modern 
democracies  and  a  core  principle  of  the  liberal  theory  upon  which  democratic 
government is based  (Norris 2011, 245). As Russel Hardin emphasizes, “in a perhaps 
strange and counterintuitive way, representative democracy and distrust go together in 
political  theory”  (Hardin  2002,  107),  prominently  in  some of  the  Federalist  Papers 
written  by  Madison,  who  warned  against  the  dangers  of  excessive  and  unchecked 
government, and, most notably, also against the forming of factions and parties. It is 
certainly  out  of  the  scope  of  this  study  to  discuss  all  theoretical  implications  and 
questions surrounding distrust in political parties. Yet after all, critical attitudes towards 
authorities might not necessarily be a 'bad' thing. Distrust can first and foremost be a 
positive attitude if  it  prevents from taking harm (Hardin 2002, 89).  Brigitte Geissel 
moreover discovered that government performance is  positively related with 'critical 
attentiveness' of citizen and provided empirical evidence for her findings. She reports 
that "states with citizenries which are strongly convinced that critical attentiveness is a 
civic duty provide extraordinary qualities of governance, whereas states with citizenries 
with a weak normative disposition of critical attentiveness score lower" (Geissel 2008, 
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865). Almond and Verba reach a similar conclusion in The Civic Culture, stating that “if 
citizens are to maintain some control over political elites, their loyalty to the system and 
to the elites must not be complete and unquestioning” (Almond and Verba 1963, 488). 
Another aspect Almond and Verba already mentioned is that “the ordinary citizen is not 
the ideal citizen" (1963, 490), which implies that the expectation of trust and an active 
'civic culture', to use Almond and Verba's term, is more a wishful ideal than a realistic  
possibility for 'ordinary' people. In that sense, critical attitudes towards authorities are a 
normal feature of every democracy.
For  some,  distrust  in  political  parties  might,  counterintuitively,  be a  symptom of 
enhanced support for democracy and rising democratic aspirations.  Ronald Inglehart 
(1999) for instance found that citizens in advanced industrialized democracies are more 
critical  of  authorities  than  their  counterparts  in  less  advanced  countries.  Such  a 
mechanism would also explain the finding that distrust in political parties rises with 
one's  level of education.  Better educated and more critical  electorates paired with a 
more sensitive perception of authoritative democratic procedures might thus be a reason 
for this seemingly paradoxical tension between support for democracy and eroding trust 
in authorities (Inglehart  1999). Moreover,  with rising levels of education,  the public 
appears  better  informed  about  politics  and  possible  solutions  to  urgent  problems. 
However,  if  globalization,  economic  integration  and  other  processes  really  render 
successful management of this world harder, then a paradox emerges. While problems 
are easier to understand, finding solutions has become harder, and the ability to do so 
did  not  necessarily  increase.  In  sum,  officials  fail  to  meet  the  demands  of  a  better  
informed public, hence “trust or faith declines because our expectations rise and we 
increasingly judge our leaders incompetent" (Hardin 2002, 162–3).  Although this is a 
speculative  interpretation,  distrust  in  political  parties  could  be  a  result  of  changing 
expectations  from  politicians  or  governments  and  increasing  support  for  more 
deliberative  and  direct  forms  of  democracy  which  challenge  long-established 
procedures of representative democracy. Reforming decision-making procedures away 
from party-centered representation may offer a potential solution to some causes of the 
low levels of confidence (Norris 1999, 270) 
Such formal  aspects  of representative democracy however  can hardly change the 
structural  problem that  trust  directed  towards  authorities  with  whom  no  individual 
relationship can be fostered is unusual because asymmetric relationships rarely result in 
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trust. For most individuals, it is impossible to be as informed about the motivation and 
interests of authorities as about the interests of, say, close friends. With only a limited 
understanding  and  observation  of  the  behavior  of  authorities,  it  is  much  easier  to 
perceive them as not concerned with the individual needs and interests of oneself. Under 
such circumstances, it is almost impossible to generate genuine trust in authorities that 
is similar to interpersonal trust in other individuals (Hardin 2002, 91). With regards to 
trust  in  authorities,  power  is  also  unevenly distributed.  the  weaker  actor  in  such  a 
relationship  –  imagine  a  voter  who decided to  cast  his  or  her  vote  for  a  particular 
political party – has no guarantee that the elected official is actually concerned with the 
individual preferences of a single voter. Certainly there are channels via which officials 
can be contacted and appealed, or voted out of office, but such “inequalities of power” 
(Hardin 2002, 101) nonetheless inhibit the development of trust.  Hardin (2002, 156) 
summarizes the problem, stating that “I must know that the agents or the institution act  
on  my  behalf  because  they  wish  to  maintain  their  relationships  with  me.  That  is 
generally  not  possible  for  government  and its  officials”.  This  structural  problem of 
nonreciprocal relationships also applies to voters and political parties and might be one 
of the causes of the generally high levels of distrust, as found in this paper. They also 
relate to Van Wessel's (2010) qualitatively substantiated observations of the feeling of 
powerlessness vis-a-vis politicans and a perceived lack of influence of politicians and 
political parties, which, unfortunately, could not be further explored in this study. This 
power asymmetry caused by the mechanisms of representative democracy however is 
an inherent feature of the very same system, and is unlikely to vanish.
Whether distrust is a desirable or even necessary aspect of democratic politics is also 
relevant with regards to the inverse relationship between strong and moderate distrust at 
the national level. It was found that total distrust in most countries stays unaffected by 
the predictor variables. Without speculating too far, this might be evidence for a 'natural' 
level of distrust among the analyzed populaces.  Hardin (2002), as mentioned above, 
insists that genuine trust in authorities is hard to generate for people who maintain an 
asymmetrical  and  non-personalized  relationship  with  authorities,  which  might  be  a 
possible explanation for the overall high levels of total distrust in political parties. It is  
possible  to  imagine  that  under  certain  conditions,  such  as  rather  disproportional 
electoral systems, fragmented party systems, perceived corruption, and certain national 
contexts,  it  is  more  likely that  a  larger  share of  this  'naturally'  occurring  distrust  is 
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transformed into strong distrust. The given results speak, tentatively, for such an effect, 
although further research on the causal mechanisms, using better  suitable indicators, 
would certainly be beneficial.
Yet, even if distrust is not a problem by itself, low confidence in political parties still 
poses certain challenges. The Eastonian concepts of specific and general support for 
political  objects,  that  are,  general  beliefs  about  the  legitimacy  of  the  political 
community and the principles of governance, offer insights about the potential effects of 
low confidence. Specific support is directed towards individual institutions, actors, and 
policies. There is a certain danger involved that prolonged low specific support for one 
of  these  objects  might  "trickle  upwards"  and also  harm the  diffuse  support  for  the 
political system itself. Arguably, eroding personal and structural legitimacy of political 
parties can lead to eroding levels of diffuse support. While this is not yet the case in 
most advanced democracies, the proliferation of populist,  'anti-system', or 'anti-party' 
parties in many European countries is a problem in the way that the object rejected by 
such parties, i.e., the 'established' parties, party democracy, or even representative liberal 
democracy itself, are already high up the ladder of abstraction in Easton's model of a 
political system. The translation of weakened diffuse support for these object into actual 
action is reinforced by the success of anti-party parties by reducing the electoral costs 
for voters to express these sentiments. This development might signal decreasing levels 
of  support  for  the  political  regime  which  exists  in  such  liberal  and  representative 
democracies. As Easton himself admits, eroding support is not a problem for a political 
system, “unless a counter-elite or organized groups [...] give direction and impulse to 
the dissafected” (Easton 1965, 224), and anti-party parties might be characterized as 
such. Even if these parties rarely challenge the political community they emerge in – 
after all,  many of these populist parties harness nationalist sentiments – the political 
community that is the European Union can be found as the focal point of concern for 
many populist parties, particularly in Western and Eastern Europe. These developments 
and the challenges originating from them underscore the necessity to better understand 
party distrust and the mechanisms behind it. 
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APPENDIX
A. Sampled countries
WVS wave Selected countries Total N of 
respondents
WVS 2005-08 Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Cyprus, Finland, 
France, Germany, Ghana, Great Britain, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, 
Mali, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Poland, Romania, 
Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Ukraine, United States, Uruguay 
44,376
B. List of variables and sources (country level)
Variable Source Indicator
Trust in Political Parties Main sample:
WVS 2005-2008
Additional samples 
for longitudinal 
analysis:
WVS 2010-2014
WVS 1999-2000
WVS 1995-1998
(V139):  
“I am going to name a number of organisations. 
For each one, could you tell me how much 
confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of 
confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very 
much confidence or none at all? Political parties”
0 A great deal 
1 Quite a lot 
2 Not very much 
3 None at all 
For country-level scores, answers options 3 and 4 
are aggregated for total distrust. Options 3 and 3 
are also aggregated by themselves as measures for 
moderate distrust and strong distrust.
On the individual level, the scale is used as an 
ordinal scale ranging from 1 to 4, allowing 
statistical methods which require at least ordinal-
level data.
Corruption Perception CPI (published 
annually)
CPI country scores
0 (highly corrupt) 
...
10 (highly clean)
Proportionality of the electoral 
system
Gallagher (2013) Gallagher's Least Square (LSq) index
0 (low disproportionality)
…
100 (high disproportionality)
Effective number of parties 
(ENP)
Gallagher (2013) Laakso's & Taagepera's Effective Number of 
Parties in Parliament
Party system polarization Manifesto Project 
Database
Polarization index scores (Dalton 2008) based on 
Left-Right scores and seat shares of parties in 
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parliament.
0 (not polarized)
…
10 (very polarized)
Age of democracy Polity IV Project Durability of the regime in years
GDP/capita IMF World Economic 
Outlook Database
GDP/capita (PPP), current US$ in the year before 
the DV was sampled
Government effectiveness World Bank 
Worldwide 
Governance Indicators
Government Effectiveness scores from the last 
WGI survey before the survey of the DV
0
…
100
Voice and Accountability World Bank 
Worldwide 
Governance Indicators
Voice and Accountability scores from the last WGI 
survey before the survey of the DV
0
…
100
C. List of variables (individual level)
Source: World Values Survey 2005-2008
Variable Indicator
Gender V235: Sex
1 Male 
2 Female 
-1 to -5 Missing values
recoded into:
0 female
1 male
Age V237: Age of respondent
Age in years
Education V238: What is the highest educational level that you have attained?
1 No formal education 
...
9 University with degree/Higher education – upper-level tertiary certificate 
-1 to -5 Missing values
Income V253: Household income 
“On this card is a scale of incomes on which 1 indicates the 'lowest income decile' and 10 
the 'highest income decile' in your country. We would like to know in what group your 
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household is. Please, specify the appropriate number, counting all wages, salaries, pensions 
and other incomes that come in.”
1 Lower step
...
10 Upper step
-1 to -5 Missing values
Left-Right 
scale
V114: In political matters, people talk of "the left" and "the right." How would you place 
your views on this scale, generally speaking? 
1 Left
...
10 Right 
-1 to -5 Missing values
Interpersonal 
trust
V23: Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to 
be very careful in dealing with people? 
1 Most people can be trusted 
2 Can´t be too careful 
-1 to -5 Missing values
recoded into
0 Can't be to careful
1 Most people can be trusted
Satisfaction 
with 
democracy
V163: And how democratically is this country being governed today? Again using a scale 
from 1 to 10, where 1 means that it is “not at all democratic” and 10 means that it is 
“completely democratic”, what position would you choose? (Code one number): 
1 Not at all democratic 
...
10 Completely democratic 
-1 to -5 Missing values
viii
D. Country-level scores and levels of distrust
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Argentina 2006 8 Free 0.9 6.9 45.6 46.6 92.2 4.99 6.49 2.9 - 23 4,782 53.70 57.70 982
Australia 2005 10 Free 1.0 12.9 68.6 17.5 86.1 8.60 2.44 8.8 .47 104 32,673 96.60 94.70 1,395
Brazil 2006 8 Free 1.8 19.2 32.7 46.3 79.0 3.00 9.32 3.3 - 21 4,743 52.70 63.00 1,485
Bulgaria 2006 9 Free 2.3 15.0 43.0 39.7 82.7 3.97 4.80 4.0 3.93 16 3,753 61.00 65.40 967
Canada 2006 10 Free 2.1 21.3 58.6 17.9 76.5 8.61 3.22 8.5 2.06 118 36,149 97.60 94.70 2,051
Chile 2006 10 Free 1.3 16.6 37.9 44.2 82.1 6.79 5.59 7.3 - 17 7,565 85.40 89.40 975
Cyprus 2006 10 Free 6.6 25.8 41.2 26.3 67.5 2.42 3.90 5.6 - 32 22,742 84.90 78.80 1,049
Finland 2005 10 Free 1.6 26.8 56.0 15.6 71.6 3.16 4.93 9.6 .62 61 36,152 99.00 99.50 996
France 2006 9 Free 1.5 14.9 46.5 37.2 83.7 21.95 2.26 7.4 5.64 37 35,107 92.20 94.20 990
Germany 2006 10 Free 0.5 12.3 53.0 34.2 87.2 2.16 4.05 8.0 6.98 16 33,603 90.70 93.80 1,996
Ghana 2007 8 Free 12.0 28.7 39.4 19.9 59.3 1.09 2.07 3.7 - 6 953 58.50 58.70 1,512
Great Britain 2006 10 Free 2.0 15.9 57.2 25.0 82.2 16.73 2.46 8.6 - 126 38,585 94.60 92.30 973
India 2006 9 Free 19.3 27.1 33.9 19.7 53.6 4.53 6.52 3.3 - 56 749 55.10 60.10 1,597
Indonesia 2006 8 Free 3.9 26.6 55.1 14.4 69.5 4.45 7.07 2.4 - 7 1,291 38.50 45.20 1,900
Italy 2005 10 Free 0.9 15.6 55.0 28.5 83.5 10.22 5.30 5.0 2.85 57 30,020 75.10 87.00 986
Japan 2005 10 Free 1.4 21.3 56.5 17.9 74.4 15,63 2,27 7.3 9.10 53 36,444 89.80 82.70 1,008
Mali 2007 7 Free 13.6 23.0 31.4 32.0 63.4 - 1,59 2.7 - 15 451 27.80 56.30 1,380
Mexico 2005 8 Free 3.5 20.5 36.3 39.9 76.2 4,74 2,76 3.5 1.87 8 7,520 63.90 58.20 1,530
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D. Country-level scores and levels of distrust (continued)
x
EN
P
CP
I
2006 10 0.7 22.6 58.2 18.5 76.7 1.03 5.54 8.7 .44 61 39,190 98.00 99.00 1,013
2004 10 0.8 14.0 67.7 17.5 85.2 2.37 3.76 9.6 6.92 127 20,224 93.70 100.00 864
2007 10 0.6 28.0 65.0 6.4 71.4 2.67 4.56 8.7 1.95 62 72,785 96.10 98.10 1,015
Peru 2006 9 1.3 3.4 45.4 49.9 95.3 13.95 3.78 3.3 - 5 2,917 32.70 49.50 1,466
2005 10 0.5 6.5 51.3 41.7 93.0 6.97 4.26 3.4 3.50 14 6,625 70.70 81.30 919
2005 9 1.2 11.7 45.6 41.4 87.0 3.74 3.36 3.0 4.10 9 3,503 51.20 60.60 1,687
2005 10 0.8 8.1 58.8 32.2 91.0 4.79 4.90 6.1 .67 14 16,965 81.50 84.10 971
2007 9 10.3 33.5 38.5 17.7 56.2 .26 1.97 5.1 - 13 5,511 69.30 68.30 2,882
2005 8 1.1 23.1 49.4 26.4 75.8 12.11 2.36 5.0 2.38 17 15,029 80.00 70.20 1,199
2007 10 2.4 26.1 55.9 15.6 71.5 4.25 2.53 6.7 4.78 29 28,081 78.50 83.20 1,163
2006 10 0.9 32.3 58.9 7.9 66.8 3.02 4.15 9.2 1.11 89 40,958 97.10 96.20 985
2007 10 1.0 25.2 62.2 11.6 73.8 2.56 4.97 9.0 3.99 159 54,321 98.50 98.60 1,185
Taiwan 2006 10 0.7 9.5 46.9 43.0 89.9 6.44 3.30 5.9 - 14 16,023 82.00 77.40 1,219
2006 10 1.5 8.2 58.1 32.1 90.2 3.71 1.98 3.2 - 44 12,346 60.50 66.30 980
Ukraine 2006 7 2.2 15.1 45.9 36.8 82.7 8.56 3.38 2.8 .15 15 1,830 34.10 41.30 871
2006 10 1.9 13.5 68.8 15.9 84.7 1.57 1.99 7.3 .23 197 44,224 91.20 89.90 1,201
Uruguay 2006 10 4.7 31.7 34.3 29.3 63.6 1.32 2.39 6.4 - 21 5,263 69.30 75.50 984
Country Ye
ar
Po
lit
y 
IV
 D
em
oc
Fr
ee
do
m
 H
ou
se
A 
gr
ea
t d
ea
l o
f 
co
nf
id
en
ce
 (%
)
Q
ui
te
 a
 lo
t o
f 
co
nf
id
en
ce
 (%
)
N
ot
 m
uc
h 
co
nf
id
en
ce
 (%
)
N
o 
co
nf
id
en
ce
 a
t 
al
l (
%
)
To
ta
l d
is
tr
us
t (
%
)
Ls
q
Po
la
riz
at
io
n
Du
ra
bi
lit
y 
(y
ea
rs
)
G
DP
/c
ap
G
ov
er
nm
en
t 
ef
fic
ie
nc
y
G
ov
er
nm
en
t 
ac
co
un
ta
bi
lit
y
N
 re
sp
on
de
nt
s
Netherlands Free
New Zealand Free
Norway Free
Free
Poland Free
Romania Free
Slovenia Free
South Africa Free
South Korea Free
Spain Free
Sweden Free
Switzerland Free
Free
Trinidad and 
Tobago Free
Free
United States Free
Free
